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Service of Process by Mail
Effective service of process notifies a defendant of proceedings
instituted against him and vests a court with personal jurisdiction over
him. 1 Use of the mails to serve process has expanded steadily since
1927, when the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts nonresident
motorist service of process statute permitting service by mail. 2
While ordinarily limited to nonresidents, service by mail is allowed
today in most states on certain resident defendants as well,3 and at
least one state has authorized such service on all defendants. 4
Nearly all statutes authorizing service by mail require the use of
registered or certified mail, 5 although statutes vary considerably with
respect to directions for effecting delivery and requirements regarding proof of delivery. 6 Frequently, service by mail is valid only if
1. For a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must
receive notification of the proceedings in a manner that satisfies the constitutional due
process standards, and, in addition, he must have sufficient contacts with the forum
state so that it would not be unfair to require him to defend there. See International
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Gray v. American Radiator & Std., Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
2. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The District of Columbia, the Virgin
Islands, and all states except Alaska permit service by mail on nonresident motorists
where use of local highways gives rise to claims against them. See Fox, NonResident Motorists Service of Process Acts, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1963). See also Annot.,
73 A.L.R.2d 1351 (1960); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1464 (1942). FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)
allows service by mail in federal district courts to the extent that it is authorized by
court rule or statute of the state in which the district court sits. BANKR. R. 704(b),
provides for service by registered or certified mail in any adversary bankruptcy
proceeding and is patterned largely after FED. R. Clv. P. 4(d).
3. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-424 to -426, -430 to -432, -463.
4. IND. R. TR. P. 4.1 (Burns 1973). Additionally, the rules provide that whenever a party seeking service of process fails to designate the preferred manner of
service in the summons, the court clerk shall mail process to the defendant at the
address indicated on the summons or at any address otherwise ascertainable. IND. R.
TR. P. 4(d) (Burns 1973).
5. Registered mail and certified mail differ from ordinary mail in that they
provide for return receipts indicating successful delivery to the addressee or a person
representing him. Certified mail differs from registered mail primarily in two
respects: (1) certified mail provides no record of sending at the post office from
which it is mailed, and (2) there is no indemnity for certified mail in case of loss or
damage. 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.1, 168.1 (1975).
Both certified mail and registered mail require records of delivery to be kept at the
post office. 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.1, 168.1 (1975). Both are dispatched and handled in
transit as ordinary mail and are taken to the addressee by postal carriers on their first
trip after receipt unless the addressee has requested the postmaster to hold his mail
for him at the post office. If the carrier cannot deliver the certified mail or
registered mail personally and obtain a signature on the return receipt, he leaves a
notice of arrival at the address, or a notice of arrival is mailed to the addressee
through regular mail channels. 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.4(a), (d), 168.S(a), (e), (f),
159.1 (a}(2)(ii) (1975).
6. -see Fox, supra note 2, at 167. The statutes set forth the procedures plaintiffs
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the plaintiff produces a receipt that has been signed by the defendant
and returned by postal authorities to the plaintiff. 7 This requirement ensures that the defendant receives actual notice of the
proceeding. 8 However, it also operates to preclude many plaintiffs
from bringing actions against defendants who, intentionally or unintentionally, avoid service. Often the statute of limitations runs
before a plaintiff can successfully commence his suit.
This Note examines the operation of the return-receipt requirement and concludes that, in light of the procedures available
to a defendant to challenge service and to reopen default judgments
entered against him, the requirement of a signed receipt is unduly
harsh on plaintiffs. In the course of this examination, the Note
details the means by which a defendant can avoid service by mail
in a return-receipt jurisdiction and explains the operation of the
various motions to challenge service of process, which, it is asserted,
can protect the defendant as well as a return-receipt requirement.
At the outset, it should be noted that service by mail without a
return-receipt requirement complies with the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Wuchter v. Pizzutti0 was the
first case in which the Supreme Court applied established standards
governing the constitutional sufficiency of notification to a statute
authorizing service of process by mail. At issue was a New Jersey
law providing for service on nonresident motorists by mailing the
process to the Secretary of State-the motorist's agent by statute.
The statute placed no duty on the Secretary of State to relay the
process to the defendant. The Court reasoned that
[t]he question made in the present case is whether a statute, making
the Secretary of State the person to receive the process, must, in order
to be valid, contain a provision making it reasonably probable that
must follow in order to effect valid service, including the prerequisites to use of
service by mail, the public official to be served in the state, the content of notice, the
method of sending notice, the place where notice is to be sent, the type of proof of the
mailing and delivery that is required, the provisions governing nondelivery, the places
where service may be effected, the persons who may serve notice, and the circumstances under which default judgment is appropriate. Id. at 225-31 (Table 3).
7. Id. at 167. Some states require a plaintiff to file a return receipt but do not
specify that it must be signed by the defendant-addressee. This scheme does not pose
the problems discussed in this Note. Arguably, the best scheme to date is that of the
Bankruptcy Rules. BANKR. R. 704(c) allows the use of any form of mail with a
signed return receipt. While BANKR. R. 704(g) specifies that a signed or refused
return receipt may operate as proof of service, it expressly provides that failure to
make proof of service does not affect its validity. The signed return receipt thus
provides evidence of service, but inability to obtain the signed return receipt does not
void service and jurisdiction.
8. See, e.g., Kohler v. Derderian, 187 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Weisfeld v.
Superior Ct., 110 Cal. App. 2d 148, 242 P.2d 29 (1952); Roland v. Shelton, 106 Ga.
App. 581, 127 S.E.2d 497 (1962); Tennant v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 286
App. Div. 117, 141 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1955).
9. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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notice of the service on the Secretary will be communicated to the
non-resident who is sued. . . . We think that a law with the effect
of this one should make a reasonable provision for such probable
communication.10
The Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it guaranteed
no "reasonable probability that if . . . complied with, the defendant
will receive actual notice." 11
The standards announced in Wuchter were elaborated upon in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 12 which today serves as
the best expression of constitutional notice requirements: "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process . . . is
notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . . The means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." 13 The Court
regarded service by mail as a permissible and reliable mode of notification and concluded that plaintiffs in the case before it should have
used service by mail rather than service by publication. 14
The Mullane test of "reasonable probability of actual notice"
has never been adequately explained by the courts, but it is clear
that a defendant need not receive the process.15 A plaintiff, therefore, is not constitutionally required to prove actual notice, whether
by producing a return receipt signed by the defendant or otherwise.
The constitutionality of a method of service is instead determined
as of the time the plaintiff completes service-that is, when he
deposits the process in the postal system. 16 The service is valid if,
when mailed, there was a "reasonable probability of actual notice,"
notwithstanding that subsequent events may preclude the defendant
10. 276 U.S. at 18-19.
11. 276 U.S. at 24.
12, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
13. 339 U.S. at 314.
14. 339 U.S. at 318-19.
15. See, e.g., Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 254, 464 S.W.2d 573, 576-77
(1971); Sommers v. Gaston, - Del.-,-, 295 A.2d 578, 580 (1972); Fernandez v.
Chamberlain, 201 S.2d 781, 785-86 (Fla. App. 1967); Barrie-Peter Pan Schools, Inc.
v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 421, 276 A.2d 74, 81 (1971); Mitchell v. Second Judicial
Dist. Ct., 82 Nev. 377, 382, 418 P.2d 994, 997 (1966).
16. See, e.g., Borgia v. Board of Review, 21 N.J. Super. 462, 91 A.2d 441
(1952). The court in Mullane concluded that "notice must be such as is reasonably
calculated to reach interested parties," which necessarily contemplates that the test of
constitutionality be applied before service reaches a defendant. 339 U.S. at 318. The
Court also stated: "We think that under such circumstances reasonable risks that
notice might not actually reach every [defendant] are justifiable. 'Now and then an
extraordinary case may tum up, but constitutional law like other moral contrivances
has to take some chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will
be done."' 339 U.S. at 319, quoting Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911). See also
Davis v. Moseley, 230 N.C. 645, 55 S.E.2d 329 (1949); McCoy v. Bureau of
Unemployment Comp., 81 Ohio App. 158, 77 N.E.2d 76 (1947).
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from receiving it. Moreover, actual receipt of process strongly suggests that the method of service provided the defendant with a
"reasonable probability" of actual notice. 17 Other factors bearing on
reasonable probability include the correctness of the letter's address
components, 18 the likelihood that the defendant will receive the
letter at the address to which it is sent, 19 the possibility of postal mis17. See Massengill v. Campbell, 391 F.2d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 1969); Schaaf v.
Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 472-73, 200 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1947). See also Heeney v.
Miner, 421 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1970); Boyd v. Dunn, 215 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Ind.
1963 ).
Jurisdictions differ as to the effect of actual notice. Some courts hold that actual
notice received prior to the commencement of the proceeding confers jurisdiction over
the defendant despite statutory noncompliance if a defendant waits until after a
default judgment is entered to contest jurisdiction. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Buckner, 233 Ark. 564, 345 S.W.2d 924 (1961); Pierson v. Fisher, 131 Cal.
App. 2d 208, 280 P.2d 491 (1955); Russell v. Edney, 227 N.C. 203, 41 S.E.2d 585
(1947). The majority position, however, is to the contrary. See, e.g., Ex parte
Smith, 258 Ala. 319, 62 S.2d 792 (1953); Jenkins v. Hill, 240 Ark. 197, 398 S.W.2d
679 (1966). It is well-settled that a defendant may quash service of process in a
timely special appearance to contest the validity of service for any deviation from the
statute, whether or not he has received actual notice. See, e.g., Syracuse Trust Co. v.
Keller, 35 Del. 304, 165 A. 327 (Super. Ct. 1932).
Considerable uncertainty and variation exist as to what constitutes actual notice.
Mullane required only that notice be reasonable under the circumstances, while Hess
and Wuclzter were notably silent on this question. Elsewhere in the law, actual
notice includes implied actual notice, consisting of facts that the party has •knowledge
of that would lead a reasonably prudent person to make a reasonably diligent inquiry.
See 1 M. MERRILL, NOTICE§§ 15-21 (1952); 66 C.J.S. Notice§ 2 (1950); Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 224 (1954); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 331 (1951). Whether the Supreme Court
intended the definition of actual notice for due process purposes to extend this far is
presently uncertain, although several courts have concluded that it did. See, e.g.,
Massengill v. Campbell, 391 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1968) (court concluded that
actual notice had been rendered by defendant's son's exclamation: "Dad, they are
suing you in Tennessee"); Mack v. Scott, 230 Ark. 510, 323 S.W.2d 929 (1959);
Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947). Arguably, implied notice
satisfies the Mullane test of reasonableness under the circumstances. Properly
applied, the implied notice concept does not prejudice the defendant, since the
standard of reasonableness depends upon the defendant's special knowledge of the
likelihood that he is being sued, the credibility of the source from which notice comes,
the credibility of the form and content of notice itself, and the ease or difficulty with
which the defendant can ascertain all the essential facts.
A final major problem concerns the source from which the actual notice must
come. Is it necessary that notice be received from the process itself, or may it come
from a wholly unrelated source? The Supreme Court has never made this clear,
although Wuclzter and Mullane clearly contemplate actual notice coming from the
service itself. Many lower court cases have either explicitly accepted a source other
than service itself or at least not rejected service effected by notice received through
an external source. See, e.g., Mack v. Scott, 230 Ark. 510, 323 S.W.2d 929 (1959)
(notice by virtue of contacts with other defendant); Furst v. Boatman, 197 Ark. 1175,
122 S.W.2d 189 (1938) (notice from conversations with other defendants properly
served); Bunnell v. Holmes, 64 Colo. 345, 171 P. 365 (1918) (notice from attorney's
investigation of land records); Montulli v. Sherlo Realty Co., 37 Misc. 2d 655, 234
N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (actual notice coming from letter to defendant from
plaintiff).
18. See text at notes 98-107 infra.
19. This problem arises when the address is as internally correct as the plaintiff-
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handling, 20 whether the letter is sent "Addressee Only," and any
special circumstances surrounding the defendant's ability to receive
mail .21
Some service-by-mail statutes require only the satisfaction of
minimum constitutional standards. Such statutes permit the use of
ordinary mail, 22 require that the process be sent to the defendant's
last known address obtainable by due diligence23 and that the
address as spelled and numbered be sufficiently accurate to create
a reasonable probability of receipt, 24 and require that the process
contain reasonable notification of the proceedings instituted against
the defendant. 25 A defendant against whom a default judgment is
entered can challenge service under these statutes on the ground that
the service failed to comply substantially with the statute,26 or that
it failed to meet constitutional notice requirements. 27 Substantial
compliance with these authorizing statutes generally occurs if the
service in a given instance does not violate due process. 28
In contrast to the above described statutes, most service-by-mail
statutes contain at least some requirements that are not constitutionally mandated. For example, many statutes demand that the plainsender intended, but the process is not directed to the defendant's current address. See
text at notes 89-97 infra.
20. This factor is not usually accorded much weight. Most courts appear to agree
with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914), that
"[i]n view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper
delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong
that the letters would reach [the defendant]." 234 U.S. at 398. To be distinguished
is the situation where postal authorities handle mail properly but postal regulations
permit a defendant to avoid successful service. See text at notes 38-74 infra.
21. Cf. Bruce v. Paxton, 31 F.R.D. 197 (E.D. Ark. 1962).
22. See, e.g., Jones v. Paxton, 27 F.2d 364 (D. Minn. 1928); Schilling v. Odlebak,
117 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929).
23. See text at notes 89-97 infra.
24. On the constitutional nature of this requirement, see Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 397 (1914). See also Towe v. Giovinetti, 164 F. Supp. 159, 160 (W.D.
Mo. 1958); Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1964); Schaaf v.
Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947).
25. That is, the notification given the defendant must satisfy minimum constitutional standards set forth for the sufficiency of process. See Tharp v. Tharp, 228
Minn. 23, 36 N.W.2d 1 (1949).
26. The concept of "substantial" compliance follows logically from the waiver
provisions, since objections to technical or insubstantial defects are waived by the
time the defendant makes a motion attacking default judgment. The concept was first
applied to service-by-mail statutes by the Supreme Court in Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 397 (1914).
27. The motion in federal courts is made under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Unlike
the motion made on the ground of excusable neglect, see text at notes 108-29 infra,
attacks on a court's jurisdiction are not subject to time limitations, are not addressed
to the court's discretion, and are not conditioned on a demonstration of a meritorious
defense. See FED. R. C1v. P. 60(b); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 2862 (1973).
28. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 398 (1914).
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tiff use registered or certified mail, 29 that the letter be restricted to
addressee only, 30 that the plaintiff send the letter to the defendant's
actual address whether or not that address can be ascertained with
due diligence, 31 that the plaintiff send notice to the defendant of service on the statutory agent, 32 and that the plaintiff file a signed
return receipt as evidence of actual delivery to the defendant. 33 As
more fully discussed below, courts confronting service that fails to
comply strictly with a statutory requirement that is not constitutionally mandated determine substantial compliance by considering legislative intent, the effect of the defect in service on the perceived
statutory purpose or policy, the likelihood of harm flowing from the
defect, and the degree of deviation from the statutory directive. 34
The rule of substantial compliance allows courts to distinguish
between technical defects, which are waived if not asserted by timely
motion or pleading, and material defects, which are not waived by
the mere passage of time. 36 Focusing on the percise language and
apparent intent of state statutes, courts have varied greatly in deciding when, notwithstanding a particular defect, service substantially
complies with the authorizing statute. 36
Because statutes that require a signed return receipt have been
uniformly construed as evidencing a legislative policy that a defendant must receive actual notice of the proceedings instituted against
him, a plaintiff generally must file a signed receipt to comply substantially with such a statute; if a plaintiff fails to produce a signed
receipt, any ensuing judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction.37
29. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. CoDE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973); R. I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 31-7-7 (1969).
30. See, e.g., IOWA CODE§ 321.501 (1966).
31. Courts have construed statutory directives providing that service be made "to"
the defendant as requiring that the process be mailed to defendant's "correct address."
See, e.g., Hertz' You Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. Castle, 317 S.W.2d 177 (Ky.
1958).
32. See Fox, supra note 2, at 225-31 (listing statutes).
33. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. CODE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973 ).
34. !See Wilson v. Refrigeration Transp., Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 781, 216 N.Y.S.2d 191
(1961).
35. See text at note 87 infra. A defendant may also waive his objection to lack of
jurisdiction by voluntarily submitting to the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction
over him. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(h)(1). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5), with
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
36. Compare Hardy v. Green, 277 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1967); Nelson v.
District Ct., 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1958); Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663,
23 S.E.2d 595 (1942); Schueren v. Querner Truck Lines, 22 Ill. App. 2d 183, 159
N.E.2d 835 (1959); Duggan v. Ogden, 278 Mass. 432, 180 N.E. 301 (1932);
Braunstein v. Phillips, 115 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1952), with Roland v. Shelton, 106
Ga. App. 581, 127 S.E.2d 497 (1962); White v. Jayne, 313 Ky. 160, 230 S.W.2d 429
(1950); Odley v. Wilson, 309 Ky. 507,218 S.W.2d 17 (1949); Schuett v. Powers, 288
Minn. 542, 180 N.W.2d 253 (1970).
37. On unforwardable mail, see Clawson v. Central Neb. Packing Co., 219 F.
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Usually, mail containing process is properly delivered and signed
for by the defendant. At times, however, mail returns refused,
unclaimed, or unforwardable and thus provides no signed returned
receipt. In such instances, the plaintiffs attempt to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant will be frustrated, despite his diligent
efforts to comply with the statute and his satisfaction of Mullane's
constitutional demands. In interpreting return-receipt requirements,
courts have dealt with refused, unclaimed, and unforwardable mail:
In the case of refused mail, they have attempted to alleviate the
deleterious effects on the plaintiff of such requirements; in the case
of unclaimed or unforwardable mail, however, they have remained
insensitive to the plaintiffs plight.
An addressee of certified or registered mail can refuse to accept
delivery from the postal carrier. When this occurs, the letter is
promptly returned to the sender, marked "Refused." 38 Courts and
legislatures generally have avoided the harsh consequences of applying the return-receipt requirement to refused mail. Some states
provide by statute that a plaintiff fully complies with a return-receipt
requirement if the defendant refuses to accept his mail. 39 Courts
elsewhere have achieved identical results by declaring, somewhat
inconsonantly, that a plaintiff substantially complies with the statute
despite the lack of a signed return receipt. 40 The lone contrary
decision has been overruled by legislation. 41
Supp. 1 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Manley v. Nelson, 50 Hawaii 484, 443 P.2d 155 (1968);
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1041 (1964). On unclaimed mail, see Paxson v. Crowson, 47 Del. 114, 87 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1952); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 S.2d 745
(Fla. App. 1960); Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310 (1944).
38. See 39 C.F.R. §§ 159.l(a)(2)(ii), 159.3(a)(1)(i) (1975). The rules
governing refusal are identical for registered, certified, and ordinary mail except that
only ordinary mail can be refused after delivery by returning the letter unopened to
the post office. 39 C.F.R. § 154.l(a) (1975). Only the addressee may refuse to
accept a letter. 39 C.F.R. § 159.1(a)(2)(ii) (1975). The addressee or person
representing him may obtain the name and address of the sender and "look at
registered mail while it is held by the postal employee, before accepting delivery and
signing the delivery receipt." 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(a) (1975). Postal regulations do
not permit an addressee to receive his mail prior to signing the return receipt, 39
C.F.R. § 161.4(a) (1975), and refusal to accept delivery results from refusal to sign
the return recipt, 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(a) (1975).
39. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. CoDE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. §
13-3-63 (1972); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-105 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 15.190 (1973-1974); TENN. CoDE ANN. §
20-226 (1955).
40. See, e.g., Boss v. Irvine, 28 F. Supp. 983 (W.D. Wash. 1939); Creadick v.
Keller, 35 Del. 169, 160 A. 909 (Super. Ct. 1932); Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla.
386, 182 S. 427 (1938); Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S.E.2d 595 (1942);
Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker,
254 Iowa 744, 119 N.W.2d 272 (1963); State ex rel. Charette v. District Ct., 107
Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750 (1939).
41. Dwyer v. Shalck, 232 App. Div. 780, 248 N.Y.S. 355 (1931). This case was
decided before the enactment of N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970),
which validates service where defendant refuses to accept his mail.
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Courts have paraded a host of reasons for finding substantial
compliance when process is refused. Principally, they maintain both
that a defendant's willful misconduct estops him from complaining
of statutory noncompliance42 and that a finding of noncompliance
would make service by mail far too easy to evade. 43 While achieving
admirable results, both reasons suffer from theoretical inconsistency:
the first because plaintiff has not been misled to his detriment, a
traditional requirement of estoppel, and the second because it does
not attempt to accommodate the competing policies. Courts that do
strive for a measure of theoretical consistency reason that the test
for substantial compliance is essentially a search for legislative intent
and conclude that the return-receipt requirement was never meant
to protect a defendant who refused his mail. 44 This reasoning is
disingenuous, however, since it fails to account for the glaring
omission of any expression of such intent in acts containing an
unambiguous requirement of a signed return receipt. Perhaps the
only sound basis for asserting jurisdiction in such circumstances lies
in recognizing that the purpose of the statutory requirement is to
provide a defendant with actual notice of the proceedings against
him45 and that a defendant who refuses mail is probably well aware
of its contents when he does so. A defendant who has refused service by mail has acted with extreme culpability in frustrating the
plaintiff's legitimate attempt to obtain a signed return receipt; denial
of jurisdiction would render service by mail a meaningless gesture,
voidable with impunity by any well-informed defendant.
The case of unclaimed mail is somewhat different. Registered
and certified mail that cannot be delivered to the addressee or a
representative thereof is returned to the post office by the postal carrier. No subsequent delivery is attempted, but the carrier leaves a
notice of arrival, informing the addressee that the letter awaits him
at the post office, at the address to which the letter is sent. 46 If
the addressee does not claim the letter within five days, the post
office issues a second notice of arrival but attempts a second delivery
only if requested by the sender. 47 Registered and certified mail is
42. See, e.g., Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386, 182 S. 427 (1938); State ex rel.
Charette v. District Ct., 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750 (1939).
43. ISee, e.g., Thomas Organ Co. v. Universal Music Co., 261 S.2d 323 (La. App.
1972).
44. See, e.g., Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386, 182 S. 427 (1938).
45. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
46. If mail is not customarily delivered by carrier to the address, no delivery is
attempted at all, and a notice of arrival will be issued through regular mail channels.
This procedure is followed when a defendant-addressee receives his mail at a post
office box. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (1975).
47. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (1975). Whenever feasible, a plaintiff should keep
track of delivery by phone and request a second delivery so that the possibility of
unclaimed mail is reduced.
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held at the post office for ten to fifteen days, 48 and then returned
to the sender marked "Unclaimed." 49 Mail most frequently returns
unclaimed when letters are addressed to "Addressee Only," since such
mail may not be delivered to or claimed by other members of the
addressee's household. 50
In most return-receipt jurisdictions, a plaintiff fails to comply
substantially with the service-by-mail statute if the process returns
unclaimed. 51 Three states provide to the contrary by statute, 52 but
courts elsewhere have refused to find substantial compliance. Often,
they have relied upon the reasoning in Paxson v. Crowson53 that
a defendant has "no duty upon him to help the plaintiff complete
the service, any more than there is a duty upon a resident defendant
to go to the sheriff's office in response to a phone call for the purpose of accepting personal service of a writ." 54 Many courts have
voiced the fear of Chief Justice Taft in Wuchter v. Pizzutti55 that
the systematic assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who fail to
claim their mail would permit a plaintiff to serve process on a
patently false address and obtain jurisdiction when the letter returns
unclaimed. 56 When process returns unclaimed, a plaintiff can avoid
48. 39 C.F.R. § 159.3(b) (1975).
49. Mail is returned marked "Unclaimed" if the addressee "fails to call for mail."
39 C.F.R. § 159.l(a)(2)(ii)(m) (1975). Unlike the recipient of ordinary mail, the
addressee of a certified or registered letter, once it is signed for, cannot return the
letter to the post office unopened and have it returned marked "Unclaimed." 39
C.F.R. § 154.l(a) (1975). Postal authorities mark a letter "Refused" only when the
addressee "has refused to accept" his mail or to pay postage deficiencies thereon. 39
C.F.R. § 159.1 (a)(2)(ii)(f) (1975).
50. Mail is restricted when the sender marks it "Deliver to Addressee Only," or
"Deliver to Addressee or Order." The latter permits delivery to addressee or a person
authorized in writing to receive his mail. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(e) (1975). Restricted
mail not deliverable as addressed is returned to the post office for the addressee to
claim. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (1975).
51. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888
(1960); Paxson v. Crowson, 47 Del. 114, 87 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1952); Lendsay v.
Cotton, 123 S.2d 745 (Fla. App. 1960); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744,
119 N.W.2d 272 (1963); Parker v. Bond, 330 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1959); Mollohan v.
North Side Cheese Co., 144 W. Va. 215, 107 S.E.2d 372 (1959). See generally
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1045 (1964).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1974) provides: "If the registered letter is
not delivered to the defendant because it is unclaimed . . . service on the defendant
shall be deemed complete on the date that the registered letter is returned to the
plaintiff or Commissioner of Motor Vehicles." Similar provisions exist in S.C. CODE
ANN. § 10-431.1 (Supp. 1974) and IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973).
53. 47 Del. 114, 87 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1952).
54. 47 Del. at 117, 87 A.2d at 882. See also General Ins. Co. of America v.
O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 (1960); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 S.2d 745 (Fla.
App. 1960); Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310 (1944). See
generally Note, The Validity of Service of Process by Mail When There ls No Return
Receipt: The Outer Limits of Due Process, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 556 (1972).
55. 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928).
56. See, e.g., Parker v. Bond. 330 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1959); Weitzman v. Potlak,
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denial of jurisdiction and possible loss of his suit only by proving that
the defendant knew the probable contents of the letter and refused
to claim it from the post office. 57 The plaintiff's burden in such a
case weighs heavy: -he cannot rely on any presumption of refusal
and his evidentiary sources are doubtless few and hostile. 58 Courts
have held insufficient showings that the defendant might have seen
the letter and refused to recover it from his post office box, 00 or that
the defendant's representative might have seen the return address
when delivery was first attempted and informed the defendant of it
later. 60 The plaintiff's only reliable protection is to monitor the post
office's efforts and request a second delivery after the first fails; if
·the second delivery fails, he can attempt to serve the defendant
personally. 61
It should be noted that much of the unclaimed mail problem
could be alleviated by not requiring plaintiffs to send process by
restricted ("Addressee Only") mail. Such mail will not reach a
defendant whose hours of employment coincide with those of the
post office and who therefore cannot claim the mail; nor will it reach
a defendant who is temporarily away from home. Moreover, when
mail is sent "Addressee Only," an evasive defendant and his family
can leave a letter unclaimed when they otherwise might have had
to refuse it. It is not clear that restricted mail is more likely to reach
the addressee than regular certified or registered mail. Because a
restricted-mail requirement increases the likelihood that a plaintiff
will be unable to serve process on a defendant, and because a
defendant is adequately protected, without the requirement, by
31 Misc. 2d 52, 217 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1961). A defendant, of course, must
have sufficient contacts with the forum state and can attack the court's jurisdiction at
any time if he does not. See note 1 supra. Taft's criticism also ignores the fact that
a plaintiff must use due diligence in finding the defendant's actual address and must
use reasonable care in addressing the letter, see text at notes 89-99 infra, and the fact
that defendant can always open a default judgment for excusable neglect, see text at
notes 106-26 infra.
51. See Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970); Zarcone v. Lesser,
190 S.2d 805, 807 (Fla. App. 1966); Wolfs v. Challacome, 218 N.W.2d 564, 569
(Iowa 1974); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 749-50, 119 N.W.2d 272,
27f, (1963).
58. A plaintiff will prevail in his attack only by successfully defeating an
inference raised by an "Unclaimed" notation that defendant-addressee innocently
failed to claim his mail. See Paxson v. Crowson, 47 Del. 114, 117, 87 A.2d 881, 882
(Super. Ct. 1952); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 S.2d 745, 747 (Fla. App. 1960); Emery
Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 751, 119 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1963). He must
show that the defendant had an opportunity to receive the letter but refused to do so.
Wolfs v. Challacome, 218 N.W.2d 564, 569-70 (Iowa 1974).
59. See, e.g., Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970).
60. ..See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888
(1960) (by implication); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 119 N.W.2d
272 (1963) (by implication).
61. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (197S) permits second delivery attempts only if the
sender so requests.
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various motions to attack judgment or service when he does not
receive actual notice, an "Addressee Only" requirement seems both
unfair and unnecessary.
Finally, unforwardable mail presents distinct problems. The
situation generally arises when the defendant has moved. Persons
changing their mailing address must file a "Change of Address"
order with the post office before postal authorities will forward their
mail. 62 Registered, certified, or first class ordinary mail addressed
to the former residence will be forwarded by postal authorities, at
no extra expense, provided that the addressee has not expressly excluded such mail in his order and has not moved outside the United
States, 63 and provided that the sender has not specified that his
letters not be forwarded. 64 A forwarding order expires one year
after filing if the addressee has not specified a shorter time. 65 Mail
that for any reason cannot be forwarded is returned to the sender
marked "Moved, left no address" or "Not deliverable as addressedUnable to forward." 66
The lack of a signed return receipt resulting from unforwardable
mail voids jurisdiction in nearly all return-receipt states. 67 Only one
reported decision has upheld jurisdiction on the ground that service
substantially complies with the statute despite the lack of a signed
return receipt, 68 and only North Carolina provides by statute that ser62. 39 C.F.R. § 158.l(a)(l) (1975).
63. 39 C.F.R. §§ 158.l(b)(l), (7) (1975).
64. Mail must be marked "Do Not Forward." 39 C.F.R. §§ 158.1 (a)(2)(v)
(ordinary mail), (b)(l) (registered and certified mail) (1975).
65. 39 C.F.R. § 158.2 (1975).
66. 39 C.F.R. §§ 159.112(b)(l), (12) (1975). The first notation means that
the addressee has moved without a change of address order; the second indicates that
an order has been filed but mail is not forwardable for some other reason. An
addressee's failure to provide a change of address order does not automatically require
mail to be returned. Directory assistance, where available, may permit the letter to
be forwarded if the addressee has not moved out of the delivery zone of his post
office. 39 C.F.R. § 159.5 (1975).
67. See, e.g., Yox v. Durgan, 298 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Clawson v.
Central Neb. Packing Co., 219 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Manley v. Nelson, 50
Hawaii 484,443 P.2d 155 (1963); Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 151 N.W.2d
562 (1967); Bauman v. Fisher, 12 App. Div. 2d 32, 208 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1960);
Bernardt v. Scianimanico, 21 Misc. 2d 182, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
68. In Fernandez v. Chamberlain, 201 S.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1967), the court
permitted service on the Secretary of State, whose mailing to the defendant's last
known address was returned marked "Refused." The court stated:
With a society as mobile as ours, when a non-resident motor vehicle owner or
operator, or a resident owner or operator who subsequently becomes a nonresident or conceals his whereabouts, accepts the privilege of the public highways of the state and is involved in an accident, he has a duty not to conceal his
whereabouts and to let his whereabouts be known so that anyone involved in
such accident . . . may come into court and seek redress. If such an owner or
operator conceals his whereabouts and makes it impossible for an aggrieved
party to serve him with notice by registered mail as provided by the statute and
· such aggrieved party shows that he has used due diligence in endeavoring to
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vice is complete when a defendant removes himself from his last
known address and leaves no forwarding address. 00 Other returnreceipt states refuse to impose upon the defendant-addressee a duty
to file a forwarding order with the post office-a conclusion consistent with the rule in these states that a defendant has no duty to claim
his mail. 70
A plaintiff can successfully defend against a defendant's jurisdictional attack when process is unforwardable only by proving that
the defendant intentionally provided the court, plaintiff, or investigating body with a false address, 71 or by showing that the defendant
willfully caused the plaintiff to delay mailing process in order to
move without a forwarding address. 72 When a defendant moves and
negligently leaves no forwarding order, the plaintiffs only hope is
that his state permits service by publication on a defendant concealing his whereabouts. But even then, plaintiff may find re-service
barred by the statute of limitations or frustrated by stringent court
rules on proving concealment. 73 The plaintiffs plight in returnreceipt states has been aptly summarized by New York's highest
court: "The argument is made that [failure to vest jurisdiction]
makes it possible for a nonresident defendant to thwart service by
registered mail . . . by simply moving and leaving no forwarding
address. This is so." 74
make service . . . the failure to file defendant's return receipt does not prevent
the court from acquiring jurisdiction.
201 S.2d at 785-86.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1974). The constitutionality of an earlier,
similar provision was upheld in Denton v. Ellis, 258 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
70. See note 54 supra. If a defendant has no duty to claim a letter even if he is
aware that it awaits him at the post office, he presumably also has no duty to go to
the same post office to file a forwarding order to accommodate service of process by
mail even before it is sent.
71. See Greenwood v. White, 25 App. Div. 2d 73, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1966);
Cohen v. Arista Truck Renting Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 729, 335 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct.
1972). See also Comment, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253: Actual Notice Nol
Necessary Where Defendant Gave False Address, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1966),
But see Drinkard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 290 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1956).
72. See Kenworthy v. Van Zandt, 71 Misc. 2d 950, 337 N.Y.S.2d 481 (New York
City Ct. 1972).
73. Service by publication, authorized by court rule or state statute, is constitutional under the test of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), when a plaintiff
cannot, by exercising due diligence, discover the defendant's whereabouts. Most
statutes and rules require the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the defendant cannot
be found or is concealing his whereabouts. See N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW § 308(5)
(McKinney 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 15.190(7) (1974); S.C. CooE ANN. § 10451(2) (1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN,§ 15-9-7 (1967). Since service by publication is in derogation of common-law rules and is of qualified constitutionality, the
statute or rule authorizing it must be strictly followed. See Harrison v. Hanvey, 265
N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965).
74. Bemardt v. Scianimanico, 21 Misc. 2d 182, 184, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1022
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
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There are thus situations where a plaintiff faced with a returnreceipt requirement will be unable, through no fault of his own, to
serve process properly by mail. Were there a Handbook for Avoiding Service, one chapter would graphically illustrate the ease with
which a cunning defendant can exploit the situation:

I.
A.

SERVICE BY MAIL

States Requiring a Signed Return Receipt

If you are a defendant in these states, you should count your
blessings and your money: service by mail requiring a signed return
receipt for jurisdiction is one of the easiest sorts to avoid. Depending
on your situation and the mode of attempted service, one of the following alternative courses of action should enable you to avoid ever
litigating on the merits.
1.

A voiding Service

a. Open a post office box and discontinue home delivery. By discontinuing home delivery you eliminate any chance of successful delivery by a postal carrier. Postal authorities will simply leave a
notice to claim in your box, which you will ignore with impunity. 75
Beware: although no defendant-addressee has a duty to claim
his mail, a court willing to distinguish prior case law may find a
refusal to accept service from the -bare fact that you failed to recover the notice from your box. Your best bet is to recover the
notice from your box after postal hours and argue that you forgot to
recover the letter thereafter. This should satisfactorily counter the
plaintiff's contention that you refused to claim the letter. 76
75. The rule followed in every jurisdiction that has faced the issue is that there is
no duty to claim mail. See note 54 supra. The advantage of a post office box is that
delivery is never made in person. The postal employees will leave a notice to claim
and rely on the defendant's active cooperation to complete delivery. 39 C.F.R. §
161.4(d) (1975). If delivery were attempted personally, you would have to accept or
refuse, either of which vests a court with jurisdiction.
76. There is a presumption that any failure to claim mail is inadvertent rather
than an intentional refusal. See, e.g., Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d
310 (1944). One delightful case you should always cite is Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F.
Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970). There, process was forwarded to the defendant and a
notice to claim was left in her husband's post office box. The notice sat there
untouched until the process-bearing letter was returned to sender mar•ked "Unclaimed." Evidence was adduced that all other mail delivered to the post office box
was properly received, raising a strong inference that the defendant ignored the notice
to claim. The court agonized over the defendant's clear refusal of service and
declared: "A proper showing that a letter lies unclaimed after numerous notices such
as occurred in this case is probably tantamount to a refusal." 319 F. Supp. at 204.
But such an inference could not rebut the presumption that unclaimed mail does not
show a refusal to accept delivery: "But such evidence [of refusal] should be presented in a deposition or oral testimony . . . . The record shows only that the notices were not picked up and the letter was unclaimed, but nothing else appears to
substantiate a concealment." 319 F. Supp. at 204. If you are so foolish as to recover
other mail from the same box which contains the notice to claim, at least be sure
not to provide the plaintiff with any direct evidence of a refusal to claim.
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b. If your state requires that process be sent "Addressee Only,"
refuse to answer the door during hours of postal delivery. Arrange
for another member of your household to greet the postal carrier.
Since he cannot deliver the letter to anyone but you, he will leave
a notice to claim, which you, of course, will disregard with impunity. 77
Use this method if served at your place of work as well. Don't be
caught offguard after one successful evasion: an alert plaintiff will
have the post office attempt a second delivery. Also, anticipate and
attempt to thwart all possible arguments that you refused to accept
service. For example, direct the person who greets the postal carrier
to tell him you are indisposed rather than absent, lest the plaintiff
disprove your alleged absence and thereby discredit your scheme.
Remember, whether or not you refused ,to claim the letter is a jury
question once the plaintiff adduces a deposition or oral testimony to
that end.'18 Since juries may well ·be unsympathetic to your evasive
tactics, avoid sending the issue to a jury.
c. If your state does not require "Addressee Only" delivery,
permit no one to answer the door when the postal carrier attempts
delivery. Disregard the notice to claim that will be left in your mailbox. The plaintiff might show that you refused to answer the door
for delivery, but this should not validate service as would a showing
of refusal to accept delivery, since you presumably were unaware of
any attempt to serve process by mail. 79 You and all members of your
household must be vigilant. This method does not work if you are
served at your place of employment.
d. Take a vacation. Not only will the carrier be unable to deliver
mail to you, but there is no hope for the plaintiff to prove refusal
to claim since you did not know you had mail at all. This method
guarantees a high degree of protection from re-service, since mail will
return "Unclaimed" and plaintiff will probably not attempt a second
mailing. Unless you are certain of service at a particular time, however, a long vacation may be necessary to ensure nondelivery.
e. Move to a new residence without filing a change of address
or forwarding order with the post office. For added protection,
change your place of employment. Unless you are careless, service
by mail will fail. 80 The plaintiff may re-serve you by publication if
11. See notes 50, 75 supra.
78. Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D.C.Z. 1970). The plaintiff will
also argue that a refusal to receive delivery when the opportunity was available vests
the court with jurisdiction. See Wolfs v. Challacombe, 218 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa
1974); Creadick v. Keller, 35 Del. 169, 171, 160 A. 909 (1932).
19. See General Ins. Co. of America v. O'Day, 114 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888
(1960); Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310,311 (1944).
80. Most courts have held the lack of a signed return receipt fatal to successful
jurisdiction when mail returns unforwardable. See, e.g., Yox v. Durgan, 298 F. Supp.
1365 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Clawson v. Central Neb. Packing Co., 219 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Ind. 1963); Manley v. Nelson, 50 Hawaii 484, 443 P.2d 155 (1968); Matney
v. Currier, 203 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1973); Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 151
N.W.2d 562 (1967); Bauman v. Fisher, 12 App. Div. 2d 32, 208 N.Y.S.2d 317
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your state permits, b_cit most states permit such alternative service
only when the plaintiff c_i,i:n show that you were concealing your
whereabouts.81 Your ,best 's_trategy is to disguise your intent to evade
service by leaving sufficient but obscure means for the plaintiff to find
your new address. The efticacy of this technique entirely depends
on the stringency of service by publication statutes, the plaintiff's diligence in effecting a second se~icy, and the artfulness with which you
disguise your intent to conceal. It is a demanding but effective ploy.
2.

Avoiding Trial on the Merits

In most instances, you will be free from liability if you evade service of process until the statute of limitations runs on the plaintiff's
claim. A court migp.t fail tq .notice the defect in service, _however,
and enter a default judgment .again~t you. If so, two courses are
available for avoiding trial on the merits.
a. Wait until the .statute of limitations runs on the plaintiff's
cause of action and then file a motion to vacate the default judgment
for lack of jurisdiction. This motion may be made at any time, and
since it does not involve the exercJse of any judicial discretion, your
delay will not prejudice its success. The only problem is that a
motion to open judgment for trial on grounds of excusable neglect
invariably must be made within, a specified time after entry of default. If you lose your jurisdict~onal attack, therefore, your delay
may cause the judgment to stand.~ 2 . It is a risk worth taking if you
are on solid ground with the jurisdictional attack.
b. Have another party set aside judgment for you. This is the
best alternative when the plaintiff cannot locate. you and another
defendant or party in interest can represent you. · The other party
can bring the jurisdictional attack prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations on the plaintiff's claim and prior to expiration of the
time to reopen judgment for excusable neglect. The plaintiff, if he
(1960); Bemardt v. Scianimanico, 21 Misc. 2d 182, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
.
81. The plaiFtiff must prove willful concealment by direct evidence; the fact that
your address is ~kown or unascertainable does not raise a presumption or permissible
inference that you are concealing yours.elf. See Harrison· v. Hanvey, 265 N.C. 243,
254-55, 143 S.E.2d 593, 601-02 (1965); Dow v. Bolden, 245 S.C. 321, 140 S.E.2d 473
(1965). Statutes permitting service by publication when the plaintiff cannot with due
diligence discover- your address have been held to require the plaintiff to exhaust all
"reasonable means'.' to find you. See Staie ex rel. Pratt v. Main, 253 Ore. 408, 413,
454 P.2d 643, 64f(1969).
82. See Ramitez v. Rackley, 45 Del. 161, 167-68, 70 A.2d 1-8, 21-22 (Super. Ct.
1949), in which the· defendant received what he believed to be improperly served
notice and waited· 16 months to move to set aside default judgment for lack of
jurisdiction. The court let the judgment stand against the defendant's jurisdictional
attack and refused to award relief on excusable neglect grounds:
[N]o good reason:.is given why Defendant should now, rather than two years
ago, elect to come:• into this Court, yet it is significant that [the facts defendant
asserts give him a 'defense on the merits] were not adduced until after, rather
than before, the statute ran on Plaintiffs claim with the result that if Defendant
were successful in .urging his legal defenses . . . Plaintiff [~ould] be deprived
of the right of a tri~l on the merits.
·
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loses, still will not know where to effect service on you. If your jurisdictional attack fails, the party representing you may move to open
the judgment for excusable neglect. 83
Levity aside, a return-receipt requirement. does effectuate the
legitimate legislative goal of providing defendants with actual notice
of actions brought against them. 84 However, it also reflects a legislative determination that may not be legitimate-namely, that the
burden on a plaintiff to re-serve a defendant within the period of
the statute of limitations is an acceptable cost of achieving that goal.
As discussed below, the various motions available to a defendant to
dismiss a default judgment and the various additional requirements
for proper service together are sufficient to protect defendants
against plaintiffs acting in bad faith; what little extra protection a
return-receipt requirement adds is clearly outweighed by the burden
imposed on plaintiffs.
Ordinarily a defendant can attack defects in service of process
before entry of judgment by a motion to dismiss or other plea in
abatement, 85 or by a motion to quash service. 86 Either motion will
succeed if the plaintiff has failed to comply precisely with statutory
requirements, although objections to technical defects are waived if
the motions are not timely made. 87 Clearly, these pre-judgment
motions can be made only when a defendant has actual notice of
the action commenced against him. As long as t-he plaintiff does
not bring his action immediately prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations, he will have adequate time in which to re-serve the
defendant properly if he loses a pre-judgment motion. Trial on the
merits is most frequently jeopardized by the statute of limitations
when the defendant lacks or ignores actual notice of the proceedings
until a default judgment is entered against him. It is in the default
context, therefore, that the merits and demerits of the return-receipt
requirement are most sharply apparent.
In a jurisdiction that does not require a signed return-receipt
(and hence does not require that defendants have actual notice),
a defendant acting in good faith is still adequately protected against
the possibility that a default judgment against him will be executed.
He can attack a default judgment either on the ground that, because
83. See Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 151 N.W.2d 562 (1967).
84. See note 8 supra.
85. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5).
86. A motion to quash generally results in the invalidation of service and the
plaintiff need only re-serve the defendant. A motion to dismiss or a plea in
abatement, on the other hand, results in the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action.
The plaintiff must re-commence the action entirely, if not barred by the statute of
limitations.
81. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(l).
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service failed to comply substantially with the authorizing statute or
failed to meet constitutional notice requirements, the judgment is
void for lack of jurisdiction, or on the ground that, because of excusable neglect, mistake, inadvertence, or the like, he defaulted. 88
For a plaintiff serving process by mail to comport with due
process and to comply substantially with the statute authorizing service by mail, he must, in general, use due diligence to discover the
defendant's actual address, 89 and must address the letter in a manner
that creates at least a reasonable probability that it will reach that
address. With regard to the former requirement, most statutes
specify that process be mailed to the defendant's "last known"
address, 00 although a few courts have erroneously concluded from
Mullane that process must be mailed to the defendant's actual
address. 01 This due diligence requirement demands much of the
plaintiff, for, while he need not in most jurisdictions exhaust all conceivable means to find the defendant's actual address, he must
employ all reasonable means. 02 Such reasonable means include, but
are not limited to, inquiry of the post office, of public utility companies, of the defendant's last known employer, and of neighbors,
relatives, and friends in the area of the defendant's last known
address. 03 Plaintiff must prove his due diligence by affidavit or
other "positive statement of probative or evidentiary facts" that show
when such inquiries were made, and his inquiries must have been
recent enough for reasonable reliance thereon. 94 Whenever a plaintiff has more than one address at which to serve the defendant, he
will not comply with the "last known" address provision if the
defendant can show that service was more likely to have been made
at an address not used. 95 'f.he stringency of the requirement was
noted by a court as early as 1931:
88. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l).
89. See Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971); Shanklin v.
Bender, 283 A.2d 651 (D.C. App. 1971); Drinkard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 290
S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1956); Central Natl. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Garrison, 114 Ohio
App. 162, 180 N.E.2d 621 (1961); Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash. 2d 36, 360
P.2d 744 (1961).
90. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 321.501 (1966); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1960).
Many courts have held that a "last known address" provision complies with the
minimum constitutional standards. See Towe v. Giovinetti, 164 F. Supp. 159 (W.D.
Mo. 1958); Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 473 (1971); Fernandez v.
Chamberlain, 201 S.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1967); Esterdahl v. Wilson, 252 Iowa 1199,
110 N.W.2d 241 (1961); Volmer v. Hoel, 87 Ohio App. 199, 93 N.E.2d 416 (1950);
Ter Harv. Backus, 259 Ore. 478, 487 P.2d 660 (1971).
91. See, e.g., Hertz' You Drive It Yourself, Inc. v. Castle, 317 S.W.2d 177 (Ky.
1958).
92. See Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255 (1931); Ter Harv. Backus,
259 Ore. 478,487 P.2d 660 (1971).
93. See Ter Harv. Backus, 259 Ore. 478,482,487 P.2d 660, 662 (1971).
94. Ter Harv. Backus, 259 Ore. 478, 482-83, 487 P.2d 660, 662 (1971).
95. See Crete v. Audet, 353 Mass. 725, 234 N.E.2d 733 (1968); Skinner v.
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[The "last known" address provision] does not mean the last
address known to the plaintiff but does mean the last address of
the defendant so far as it is known, that is, by those who under the
ordinary circumstances of life would know it. Unless the defendant
has departed for parts unknown it means his actual address; if he
has disappeared, it means his last address so far as it is reasonably
possible to ascertain it. This address the plaintiff must learn at his
peril and only if the copy is mailed to it is there a compliance with
the statute. 96

A defendant who can show that the plaintiff did or should have ascertained his actual address can set aside default judgment in a
nonretum-receipt state as void for lack of jurisdiction.07
To address the process-bearing letter properly, a plaintiff need
only provide the defendant with a reasonable probability of receipt. No statute requires that the defendant's name be correctly spelled and the street and city address correctly numbered
and spelled. Courts generally consider a number of factors in
determining substantial statutory compliance, 98 including whether
an error in the defendant's name is in his first, middle, or last
name,99 whether the name as pronounced properly resembles the
pronounced name as spelled on the letter, 100 whether the name
Mueller, 1 Wis. 2d 328, 335-36, 84 N.W.2d 71, 75 (1957) (indicating that the test
whether one address was more likely to be where defendant would receive his mail is
a test of foresight, determined at the time of mailing).
96. Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 80, 154 A. 255,258 (1931).
91. See Conner v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 313, 96 N.E.2d 13 (1950); Central Natl.
Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Garrison, 114 Ohio App. 162, 180 N.E.2d 621 (1961). It
should also be noted that whenever a plaintiff gives a defendant notice of the default
(for example, by executing judgment), the defendant has a powerful argument that
the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to locate him earlier when service was
attempted.
98. Most cases involving misnomers in the process itself arise when the plaintiff
moves to amend on his own initiative upon discovering the error before default
occurs, or when the defendant moves to quash service or dismiss the action for faulty
service. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 285 (1972).
99. The tests of idem sonans and similarity of written words should not be used as
the ultimate standard of compliance, but rather should be used as factors to consider
in assessing the reasonable probability that the letter as addressed would reach the
defendant: This is made clear in Grannis, where the Court said: "[WJe need not
confine ourselves to the test of idem so11a11s, nor to the appearance of the name in
print, but may employ both of these, with such additional tests as may be available in
view of what is disclosed by the record." 234 U.S. at 397. Generally, however, a
misnomer satisfying the idem sonans or similarity of written words tests will also
satisfy the Grannis test of "reasonable probability" or actual notice. But a misnomer
failing the idem so11a11s or similarity of written words tests will not necessarily fail the
Grannis constitutional standard.
Similarly, while the location of the misspelling in the name is obviously a factor
of considerable importance, the fiction that middle initials are no part of a name
should be abandoned. While an error in the middle initial will be insignificant in
most cases, the rule should not apply in the rare case where such error is substantial.
To hold as a rigid rule that service is always valid in such cases ignores the Grannis
holding.
100. In Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964), the court held that
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as actually spelled resembles the correctly spelled name alphabetically,101 whether the defendant actually received the letter as
addressed, 102 the size of the city to which the letter was sent,103 and
whether the defendant who received the misaddressed letter refused
it in good faith, thinking it was meant for another. 104 A few courts,
however, have adopted firm rules-notably, that a mistaken middle
initial can never be substantial noncompliance. 105 Interpreting a
statute requiring only the minimum constitutional standards, the
Supreme Court in Grannis v. Ordean106 concluded that, while the
foregoing tests were helpful, the ultimate standard for testing statutory compliance was "whether, when [the letter] reached the post
office [it] would, in reasonable probability, be delivered to [the defendant] ." 107
Even if a plaintiff has complied with the requirements of due
diligence in finding the defendant's address and has taken reasonable care in addressing the letter, the defendant still has an opportunity to set aside a default judgment on the ground of excusable
neglect. 108 Unlike the motion to dismiss for failure to comply sub"Edwin" sounded sufficiently similar to "Edward" that the defendant had actual
notice of the action and service substantially complied with the statute.
The theory behind the doctrine of idem sonans is that the purpose of a name is
merely a means of identifying the particular person. Such purpose is achieved when
the name as written incorrectly is pronounced similarly to the correctly spelled name.
In light of the many variations in spelling possible to achieve similar sounds, the
application of the idem sonans doctrine is extremely flexible. See 57 AM. JUR. 2d
Name§§ 17-21 (1971).
101. See Spence v. Commercial Motor Freight, 99 Ohio App. 14~, 127 N.E.2d
427 (1954).
102. See Scharf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947). See also United
States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163 (D. Mont. 1948); Sacco v. Frilund, 32 Misc. 2d 834,
222 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1961); In re Edwards Trust, 142 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
103. Compare Gluszek v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(process addressed to "Anastasia Gluszek, Chester, Pennsylvania" held invalid for
statutory noncompliance for omission of street name and number in letter sent to city
of 60,000 people), with Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 S. 483 (1933) (service
by mail lacking street name and number upheld when sent to and received in Carson
City, Nevada, a town of 2,000 people).
104. See Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc., 140 Colo. 593, 348 P.2d 370 (1959);
Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964); Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466,
200 S.W.2d 909 (1947).
105. See Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc., 140 Colo. 593, 348 P.2d 370 (1959);
Nelson v. District Ct., 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1957).
106. 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
107. 234 U.S. at 396-97. The Supreme Court in Grannis confronted the issue
whether there had been compliance with the statutory requirement that plaintiff mail
process "to" the defendant when the plaintiff-sender misspelled the defendant's name
on the address. The Court apparently accepted the state court's determination that
such a statutory provision required compliance with constitutional due process standards, since the statute's constitutionality was neither challenged nor discussed.
108. Twenty-eight states have provisions identical to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l),
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stantially with the service-by-mail statute, the excusable neglect
motion reopens the judgment for a trial on the merits. Because this
result is less desirable to the defendant, he will employ a motion for
excusable neglect only if the plaintiff has substantially complied with
the statute. The excusable neglect motion is available only if the
defendant has an adequate excuse for failing to plead or otherwise
which permits the opening of a default judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect." ALA. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); ALAS. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); ARIZ.
R. CIV. P. 60(c)(l); COLO. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); DEL. SUPER. CT. (av.) R. 60(b)
(1); FLA. R. C1v. P. 1.540(b)(l); HAWAII R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); IDAHO R. CIV, P.
60(b)(l); IND. R. TR. P. 60(b)(l); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-260(b)(l) (1964); KY.
R. CIV. P. 60.02(1); ME. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); MASS. av. R. 60(b)(l); MINN. DIST.
CT. R. 60.02(1); MONT. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); NEV. R. C1v. P. 60(b){l); N.J. av.
PRAc. R. 4:50-l(a); N.M. R. CIV. P. 60(b){l); N.C. R. av. P. 60(b)(l); N.D. R.
CIV. P. 60(b)(l); Omo R. CIV. P. 60(B)(l); R.I. R. C1v. P. 60(b)(l); S.D. COMP,
LAWS ANN. § 15-6-60(b)(l) (1967); TENN. R. av. P. 60.02(1); UTAH R. CIV. P.
60(b)(l); VT. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); WASH. SUPER. CT. (CIV.) R. 60(b)(l); W. VA.
R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); Wis. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); WYO. R. av. P. 60(b)(l).
Four other states have adopted generally the federal standards of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" although not in identical form. CAL.
av. PRAc. CODE§ 473 (West Supp. 1975); IowA R. CIV. P. 236; ORE. REV. STAT. §
18.160 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 10-1213 (1962).
Eleven states have statutes or rules that operate the same as FED, R. CIV. P.
60(b)(l) using analogous standards. .ARK. STAT. ANN,§ 29-401 (1962) ("nothing in
this Act shall impair the discretion of the Court to set aside any default judgment
upon showing of excusable neglect, unavoidable casualty or other just cause"); CONN,
GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 52-212 (Supp. 1975) ("mistake, accident, or other reasonable
cause"); GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-160(e) (1967) ("fraud, accident or mistake"); ILL,
REv. SrAT. ch. 110, § 50(5) (1968) (court may set aside judgment "in its discretion",
interpreted to include excusable neglect, Schmidt v. Stiller, 9 Ill. App. 2d 415, 132
N.E.2d 687 (1956) ); MD. DIST. CT. R. 625 (giving the court discretion only for
fraud, mistake, or irregularity); MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 520.4 ("for good cause shown,"
interpreted to include excusable neglect, Albro Leasing, Inc. v. Sylvester, 40 Mich.
App. 227, 198 N.W.2d 437 (1972)); Mo. REv. STAT. § 511.120 (1952) ("for good
cause shown," interpreted as requiring reasonable diligence or excuse to set judgment
aside, Whitledge v. Anderson Air Activities, Inc., 276 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1955) ); NEB,
REv. SrAT. § 25-2001(7) (1964) (for "unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing
the party from prosecuting or defending"); N.Y.R. Crv. PRAc. 5015(a)(l) ("excusa•
ble default"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1031(7) ("for unavoidable casualty or misfortune"); Tux. R. CIV. P. 320 ("for good cause," interpreted to permit setting judgment
aside whenever not the result of movant's gross neglect or intentional misconduct,
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Burton, 272 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App. 1954)).
Five remaining states have either vague statutes or no provisions at all for setting
aside a default judgment. Courts in these states have devised the motion judicially. In
Mississippi a defendant may set aside judgment "if justice demands that the default
, judgment be set aside and a trial had on the merits." Ponder v. O'Neal Electric Co.,
214 S.2d 453, 455 (Miss. 1968). LA. CODE C1v. P. art. 2004 (1961), allows
judgment to be set aside for "fraud or ill practices," which has been construed to
allow relief wherever default would be "unconscientious and inequitable." Bell v.
Holdcraft, 196 S. 379 (La. App. 1940). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514:2 (1955)
allows judgment to be set aside "at the discretion of the court," but courts have not
bad occasion to interpret the statute. See Lewellyn v. Follansbee, 94 N.H. 111, 47
A.2d 572 (1946). Pennsylvania's common-law rule requires defendants seeking to set
aside default judgments to demonstrate: (1) an excusable reason for the default, (2)
a meritorious defense, (3) raised by timely motion. Stott v. Triad Distributors, Inc.,
327 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 1974). Virginia's common-law rule is harsher than the
federal rule, and permits defendant to set aside judgment only when he has acted
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defend109 and has a meritorious defense to the plaintiffs claim. 110
The motion is directed to the court's sound legal discretion, and,
unlike a motion to set aside judgment for lack of jurisdiction, it is
never granted as a matter of right. 111 The defendant usually must
make his motion within a specified time after entry of default,112
although, if the plaintiff delays executing judgment to avoid giving
the defendant notice of the default, courts can and should disregard
the time limits.11 3
without negligence. Powell v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Lynchburg, Inc., 213 Va. 647,
194 S.E.2d 742 (1973).
109. Because the defendant concedes that the court has jurisdiction over him, the
case is not thrown out entirely and the plaintiff need not recommence his action by
reserving the defendant. Statutes or court rules authorizing the motion may express
the excusable reason as "excusable neglect," "inadvertence," "surprise," "mistake,"
"unavoidable casualty," and the like. See notes 114-25 infra and accompanying text.
110. Although there may be minor differences among jurisdictions, the meritorious defense requirement generally can be easily satisfied. The requirement aims at
denying vacation of default judgment only where the defendant's lack of defense
would make trial on the merits a useless gesture. To satisfy the court that his defense
is "meritorious," the defendant need only state the facts and legal theory upon which
his case relies. See Lamoreaux v. Havranek, 25 Ill. App. 2d 51, 53, 165 N.E.2d 547,
549 (1960). See also Robinson v. Bantam Books, 49 F.R.D. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Simmons v. Flotz, 530 P.2d 999, 1000 (Colo. App. 1974); Hotel Last Frontier Corp.
v. Frontier Properties, Inc., 79 Nev. 150, 380 P.2d 293 (1963). The defendant need
not prove or substantiate his case to the court in order to present a meritorious
defense. See Evry v. Tremble, 154 Cal. App. 2d. 444, 448, 316 P.2d 49, 52 (1957);
Ehrlinger v. Parker, 137 Colo. 514, 327 P.2d 267 (1958); Medford Red Cab, Inc. v.
Duncan, 341 Mass. 708, 709-10, 172 N.E.2d 260, 261 (1961); National Surety Corp.
v. Shoemaker, 86 S.D. 302, 310, 195 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1972).
111. See Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970); TholJ)e v. Thorpe,
364 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Teal v. King Farms Co., 18 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Pa.
1955); Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal. 2d 274, 148 P.2d 611 (1944).
112. The time period under the federal rules is one year. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
A handful of states have no fixed time limit and permit any excusable neglect motion
that is made with due diligence after receipt of actual notice of the entry of default
judgment. See, e.g., Foster v. Nixon, 194 Pa. Super. 572, 168 A.2d 630 (1961)
(!aches alone bars the motion); Broome v. Broome, 230 S.C. 155, 94 S.E.2d 439
(1956) (delay of three years held not without due diligence where defendant lacked
actual notice before that time); Brothers Dept. Store, Inc. v. Berenzweig, 333 S.W.2d
445 (Tex. App. 1960) (defendant need only show that delay in moving to vacate
judgment for excusable neglect will not injure plaintiff).
113. A few jurisdictions have held that there must be strict complaince with the
time limits imposed by court rule or statute regardless of any excuses for an untimely
motion. Most such jurisdictions have not confronted the situation where the plaintiff
delays execution of judgment to perpetuate the defendant's ignorance of default.
See, e.g., Waxler v. Levin, 131 A.2d 294 (D.C. App. 1957). In jurisdictions
dispensing with strict time limits when the plaintiff engages in fraud, a defendant
victimized by lack of notice of default judgment may argue that the plaintiffs delay in
executing judgment permits an otherwise untimely motion and works an injustice. See
Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1970); Byron v. Bleakley
Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Some courts permit defendants to assert untimely motions by simply ignoring the time requirement where the
defendants' delay is caused by their innocent lack of notice of the entry of default
judgment. See, e.g., Martinez v. Valdez, 9 Ill. App. 3d 895, 293 N.E.2d 443 (1973);
Levine v. Berlin, 46 App. Div. 2d 902, 362 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188-89 (1974).
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One adequate excuse for defaulting is lack of actual notice of
proceedings, and this excuse is available whether mail returns
unclaimed114 or unforwardable, 115 when postal mishandling or incorrectly spelled or numbered address causes nonreceipt, 116 or when a
forwarding agent malperforms.11 7 A defendant generally will lose
his motion if he has intentionally concealed his whereabouts or given
the plaintiff a faulty address at which to mail the process. 118 A
defendant who disregarded actual notice of the proceedings will be
deemed to have acted inexcusably, although he may prevail by
presenting an adequate excuse for his actions. 110 If the processbearing letter returns "Refused," the defendant can set aside the
judgment only by demonstrating an acceptable reason for the refusal: for example, that a third party refused delivery without his
knowledge, 120 or that postal authorities improperly marked the letter
"Refused."121 If the default is caused by a third party entrusted by
the defendant to receive notice, courts will open the judgment unless
the defendant's appointment of the third party was unreasonable and
unnecessary. 122 In determining the adequacy of the excuse in these
114. See Koukal v. Coy, 219 Ore. 414, 347 P.2d 602 (1959).
115. See Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Hamilton v. Bogorad, Klein, Schuwolf, Masciovecchio, 275 S.2d 41 (Fla. App. 1973).
116. See Jones v. Lindsey, 114 Cal. App. 2d 237, 250 P.2d 153 (1952); Miller v.
Holzhauser, 19 Misc. 2d 619, 192 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
117. See Hom v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Ellington v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Eldridge v. Jagger, 83 Ariz. 150, 317
P.2d 942 (1957); Rossten v. Wolf, 14 Ill. App. 2d 322, 144 N.E.2d 757 (1957);
Gurwitz v. Vim Blee. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 890, 172 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup, Ct. 1958);
Townsend v. Carolina Coach Co., 231 N.C. 81, 56 S.E.2d 39 (1949).
118. See Detelich v. Mayo's R & A Clothing, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 788, 304 N.Y.S.2d
67 (Sup. Ct. 1969); General Crane Serv., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 27
Misc. 2d 403, 208 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
119. See Saltzman v. Birrell, 156 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Pierson v.
Fischer, 131 Cal. App. 2d 208, 280 P.2d 491 (1955); Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 218
Cal. 321, 23 P.2d 277 (1932); Bunnell v. Holmes, 64 Colo. 345, 171 P. 365 (1918);
Fullen v. Wunderlich, 54 Colo. 349, 130 P. 1007 (1913).
120. See Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937). See also
Fox, supra note 2, at 185.
121. See Morrissey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, 106 (M.D.N.C. 1956), A
defendant's contention that he was unaware of the gravity of the situation when he
refused service by mail does not constitute inadvertence or excusable neglect, See
Residential Reproofing Union, Local 30-B v. Mezicco, 55 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Pa.
1972). A defendant's only acceptable excuse would be that an unauthorized third
party refused his mail without his knowledge. See Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa.
Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937).
122. See Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969); Butner v, Neustadter
324 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1963); Wolfsohn v. Raab, 11 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1951):
Dann v. Gumbiner, 29 Ill. App. 2d 374, 173 N.E.2d 525 (1961). Some courts hav~
imposed a duty upon the defendant to monitor mail in transit after he has received
service and sent it to a third party. See Robinson v. Bantam Books, 49 F.R.D. 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Texas Indein. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 271 S.W. 134 (Tex, Civ. App.
1925).
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various situations, courts also consider the amount of prejudice the
delay has caused the plaintiff,123 the amount of money involved, 124
and whether the default is primarily technical. 125
In addition to showing an acceptable excuse for default, the
defendant must demonstrate a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's
claim.126 While the standards for testing the merits of a defense
are not stringent, the passage of time may weaken the defendant's
case and thereby lessen his chance of succeeding on the motion.
The two statutory and constitutional requirements for jurisdiction
-that plaintiff use due diligence in finding defendant's address and
use care in addressing the letter-together with the motion for excusable neglect, provide substantial protection for a defendant. If
a plaintiff complies with the jurisdictional requisites, the chances are
extremely high that the defendant will receive the process unless he
has moved from his last known address without leaving a forwarding
address with the post office, with his employer, with a neighbor, or
with the new resident of his home. It thus seems fair to say that
a defendant who receives no actual notice of proceedings instituted
against him, notwithstanding substantial statutory compliance by the
plaintiff, is more to blame for that lack of notice than the plaintiff.
Even in such an instance, the defendant can set aside the judgment
for excusable neglect and present his defenses. The cost to the
defendant, therefore, is only that he litigate a possibly stale cause
of action. The benefit to the plaintiff is the assurance that, if he
complies with the service-by-mail statute, he will not lose his cause
of action. Finally, a plaintiff is unlikely to fail deliberately to comply
with the two jurisdictional requirements since, if he fails to comply,
the defendant can dismiss the judgment for lack of jurisdiction and,
if the statute of limitations has expired, thereby preclude the
plaintiff from recommencing his suit.
In light of these protections, there is little need for a returnreceipt requirement. Courts sitting in nonretum-receipt states have
uniformly held that service by mail that is refused by the defendant
provides the defendant with a "reasonable probability" of actual
notice127 and thus can be set aside only for excusable neglect-the
123. Prejudice to the plaintiff may include loss of evidence resulting from delay,
difficulty of discovery, fraud, additional costs, and other unreasonable burdens. See
generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27, at§ 2699.
124. See Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966); Tozer v. Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1961); Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
125. See Ciccarello v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 1 F.R.D. 491 (S.D. W. Va.
1940).
126. See note 110 supra.
127. The filing of a return receipt by a plaintiff is not a constitutional requirement of due process, Spur v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960),
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same result reached in return-receipt states. The two approaches
differ with regard to process-bearing letters that are unclaimed or
unforwardable. Courts in return-receipt jurisdictions conclude that
neither complies substantially with the return-receipt requirement.
Courts in nonreturn-receipt jurisdictions generally search for the
reason that the process was unclaimed or unforwardable: If the
plaintiff failed to use due diligence, the court lacks jurisdiction; if
the plaintiff did all that can reasonably be expected of him, the judgment stands unless the defendant can show that he in fact lacked
actual notice or, for some other excusable reason, failed to plead or
otherwise defend. 128
The excusable neglect motion available to the defendant operates fairly: no deserving defendant can be denied the motion
without a reversible abuse of discretion by the trial court, 120 the availability of the motion depends on the degree of the defendant's culpability and thereby discourages fraudulent evasive conduct, and the
grant of the defendant's motion opens judgment to immediate trial
and service by refused mail satisfies the constitutional due process standards, Wax v.
Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937).
128. The distinction is that a plaintiff in a nonretum-receipt state who uses
reasonable diligence to locate and serve the defendant cannot lose his claim to a
successful jurisdictional attack. At best, the defendant can avail himself of the
excusable neglect motion to open judgment.
The few nonretum-receipt cases dealing with unclaimed mail have held that it
satisfies constitutional due process requirements and thereby vests the court with
jurisdiction. In Barrie-Peter Pan Schools, Inc. v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 421, 276
A.2d 74, 81 (1971), the court concluded:
It clearly appears that legitimate efforts were made to notify the defendant corporation of this action and that those efforts were by means reasonably calculated to bring the attention of the corporation to the pendency of the proceeding.
We do not regard the failure of the corporation to claim from the post office
the notice admittedly sent to it by the Department as invalidating what under
these circumstances was an otherwise valid service of process.
See also Koukal v. Coy, 219 Ore. 414, 347 P.2d 602 (1959). It is also clear from the
cases that service by unforwardable mail satisfies constitutional due process requirements. See Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971); Sommers v.
Gaston, - Del.-, 295 A.2d 578 (Super. Ct. 1972); Swift v. Leasure, - Del.-,
285 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. 1971); Mitchell v. Second Judicial Dist, Ct., 82 Nev. 377,
418 P.2d 994 (1966).
129. See Railway Express Agency v. Jansen, 351 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Okla. 1960);
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 417, 303 P.2d 995, 996 (1956). The cases
indicate that whenever a defendant defaults because he innocently or excusably failed
to receive notice of a pending action, his motion to vacate judgment for excusable
neglect should be granted, and denial of the motion abuses the trial court's discretion.
See Mitrovich v. Lipovic, 27 III. App. 2d 302, 169 N.E.2d 598 (1960); Morabito v.
Champion Swimming Pool, 18 App. Div. 2d 706, 236 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1962), Some
courts have indicated a willingness to set default judgments aside where defendants
received timely notice of the action but negligently and excusably failed to plead or
defend. Gore v. Witt, 11 Cal. App. 2d 728, 308 P.2d 770 (1957) (excusable neglect
of attorney who was misinformed of correct service date); McDowell v. Jarnagin, 56
Ill. App. 2d 395, 206 N.E.2d 497 (1965) (reasonable reliance on insurance company
to defend case); Eshelman Motors v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 189 A.2d 818 (1963)
(financial ability of defendant to retain counsel in time to prevent default),
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on the merits, rather than possibly foreclosing adjudication entirely.
The only material danger to which the defendant remains vulnerable
in a nonreturn-receipt state is the possibility of postal mi~handling,
since jurisdiction attaches, if at all, before receipt by the postal system.130 This danger, however, is minimal. Very few reported cases
involving postal mishandling have arisen, and, in all instances, courts
granted motions for excusable neglect where the defendant's lack of
notice was innocent or excusably negligent. 131
The requirement of a signed return receipt makes actual notice
necessary to vest a court with jurisdiction over the defendant. Since
mail returned unclaimed or unforwardable may confer jurisdiction
under Mullane's principles, the requirement of a signed return
receipt is undeniably extra-constitutional. And, as we have seen, the
requirement is unnecessary and a hindrance to the equitable resolution of all legitimate claims. The requirement gives a defendant a
jurisdictional attack, notwithstanding the plaintiffs compliance with
Mullane, where he would otherwise have to rely on the excusable
neglect motion to open a default judgment. The excusable neglect
motion is considerably more appropriate since it does not force the
plaintiff to recommence his action. While an excusable neglect
motion may force a defendant to litigate a stale claim, most state
legislatures apparently have decided that this burden does not justify
the enactment of a return-receipt provision.
The argument against the return-receipt requirement does not
suggest that service-by-mail statutes should never impose extraconstitutional burdens on plaintiffs. Many requirements, such as the
use of registered or certified mail and the requirement that the plaintiff file an affidavit of compliance as a prerequisite to jurisdiction,
are necessary to protect defendants and do not overburden plaintiffs.
But the imposition of extra-constitutional burdens with which a
plaintiff may be unable to comply unduly penalizes a plaintiff for
innocent conduct and serves no deterrent purpose. Instead, the excusable neglect motion should be allowed to perform its function of
putting two innocent or excusably negligent parties where they would
have been had all proceeded properly from the start: in court,
conducting trial on the merits.
130. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 319" (1950)
(by implication).
131. See Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970) (mail truck burned,
defendant's motion denied only because he lacked a meritorious defense); Miller v.
F.M.W. Drilling Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 728, 295 P.2d 412 (1956) (letter either lost in
mails or misaddressed}; Dann v. Gumbiner, 29 Ill. App. 2d 374, 173 N.E.2d 525
(1961) (process lost in regular mails).
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